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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 20608

-vROBERT GLEN HOUTZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue presented in this appeal that requires
consideration by the Court is whether the trial court erred in
ordering that trial proceed without defendant present.
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Defendant, Robert Glen Houtz, was charged with two
counts of automobile homicide, a third degree felony, under UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-207 (1978) (amended 1985); two counts of driving
while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury, a
class A misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44(1) and (3)
(Supp. 1985); leaving the scene of an accident involving personal
injury or death, a class A misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-6-29 (Supp. 1985); leaving the scene of an accident
involving damage to a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, under UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-6-30 (1981); and failure to report an accident, a
class B misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-34 (1981) (R. 24).

After a trial, at which defendant was not present, the jury

returned verdicts of guilty on all charges (R. 91-7).

The trial

court then sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for the
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following terms: two consecutive terms of zero to five years for
the automobile homicide convictions, two concurrent terms of 364
days for driving while under the influence of alcohol and causing
bodily injury to be served consecutively to the automobile
homicide sentences, and a term of 364 days for leaving the scene
of an accident that resulted in death or injury to run
concurrently with the sentence imposed for driving while under
the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury.

No

additional sentences were imposed for leaving the scene of an
accident and failure to report an accident.

The trial court

further ordered that defendant pay a fine of $5,000 for the
automobile homicide convictions and restitution to the victims in
the amount of $7,673.70 (R. 114-8).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case came before the trial court on February 25,
1985, but was set for trial on the following day because
defendant was not present.

On the morning of the 26th, defendant

again failed to appear, and the trial court, unwilling to proceed
with a non-jury trial—which defense counsel indicated defendant
desired—without an in-court waiver of the jury by defendant
himself, set the trial over another day (Transcript of Feb. 26,
1985 at 2, 8-10).

On the 27th, defendant, for the third time,

failed to appear for trial. Defense counsel indicated to the
court that he had spoken with defendant on February 23 and
informed him of his February 26th trial date.

He then told the

court that, at approximately 10:00 p.m. on the 26th, the
prosecutor received word that defendant had been incarcerated on

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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February 25 in San Diego, Califonia on a drunk driving charge.
Neither of the parties could say whether defendant had posted the
$750 bail set for that charge or been released on other terms.
It was also noted that defendant had agreed to remain in Salt
Lake County as a condition to a pretrial bail reduction in the
Beaver County case. Based upon these representations, which were
not in dispute, defendant's counsel moved for a continuance of
trial until defendant could return from San Diego and appear at
trial.

After summarizing the facts before it, the trial court

denied this motion and ordered that trial proceed without
defendant.

The court specifically ruled that defendant's absence

from trial was voluntary and without good cause (Transcript of
Feb. 27, 1985 at 16-24; Addendum).
Subsequently, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on
all the charges against defendant. On March 1, 19 85, defendant
waived extradition from San Diego County to Utah (R. 43). He was
voluntarily present for sentencing in the trial court seventeen
days later (R. 115).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under federal and Utah law, a criminal defendant has
the right to be present at trial. Although that right may be
waived by the defendant's voluntary absence, the trial court in
the instant case had before it insufficient information upon
which to rule that defendant was voluntarily absent on the date
of his trial. Because it had information that defendant was
probably incarcerated in San Diego, California on the day of
trial, the trial court improperly ordered that trial proceed

-3-
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without him.

With t h a t information, the court simply could not

have safely assumed t h a t defendant's absence was voluntary.
Accordingly, defendant's convictions should be reversed and h i s
case remanded for a new t r i a l .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE IT APPEARS THAT THE TRIAL COURT
VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT
TRIAL, HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED AND
THE CASE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

A r t i c l e I § 12 of the Utah Constitution s t a t e s t h a t
" t i l n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the r i g h t to
appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . ."
i s codified in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6 (1982).

This r i g h t

A similar right

i s afforded under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n )

I l l i n o i s v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337

(1970); S t a t e v. GlennfrL#56 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1982).

However,

the r i g h t to be present a t t r i a l i s a personal r i g h t which may be
waived by a defendant.

Glenny. 656 P.2d a t 992.

This i s

codified in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1982), which provides in
pertinent part:
(a) In a l l cases the defendant s h a l l have the
right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel. The defendant s h a l l be personally
present a t the t r i a l with the following
exceptions:
ik\ •

•

•

iV/(2) in prosecutions for offenses not
^ punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from t r i a l after notice to
defendant of the time for t r i a l shall not
prevent the case from being t r i e d and a
v e r d i c t or judgment entered therein s h a l l
have the same effect as if defendant had been
present!.]
[Emphasis added.]
-4-
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A voluntary waiver may be e s t a b l i s h e d by the conduct or words of
the defendant, but i t i s the S t a t e ' s burden to e s t a b l i s h t h a t the
waiver i s v o l u n t a r y .

£ee_ State v. Ross. 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah P ^

1982). ^&3^^r**^

^ ^ ^ / a ^ ^ m^-r,^

The question presented in the instant case is whether
the trial court correctly ruled that defendant's absence from
trial was voluntary and that trial could therefore proceed
without him.

The court ruled this way even though it had before

it undisputed information that defendant had been incarcerated in
San Diego two days before trial and nothing to indicate that
defendant was not still incarcerated on the days trial proceeded
in his absence.

Under these circumstances, it appears the court

had insufficient information upon which to base its conclusion
that defendant's absence was voluntary and without good cause.
The court simply could not have safely assumed that defendant was
no longer incarcerated at the time of trial, or that he had
voluntarily waived his right to be present.

Defendant's waiver

of extradition from San Diego County on March l f 1985 and his
court appearance in Utah on March 18 for sentencing weighs
against the validity of such an assumption.

Furthermore,

defendant's presence in San Diego on February 25 would not in
itself, setting aside the question of incarceration, have made it
impossible for him to have attended trial in Utah on either that
day or the 26th, and thus render his absence voluntary.

It being

clear that, when a defendant is in custody, the trial court has a
duty to see that he is personally present at every stage of
trial, State v. Aikers. 87 Utah 507, 515, 51 P.2d 1052, 1056
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(1935) , the court heref which in all fairness had to assume that
defendant was still incarcerated in San Diego on the date of
trial, erred when it ordered that trial proceed without him
present.

Given the information available, the court could not

reasonably determine that defendant's absence was voluntary.1
See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) (noting, in
dictum, that a defendant in custodyjdoes not have the power to
waive his right to be present) ; State v. Coles, 688 P.2d 473
(Ut§h 1984); United States v. Crutcher. 405 F.2d 239, 243 (2d
Cir. 1968), ££i± ££ni£Ld, 394 U.S. 908 (1969) (holding that an
incarcerated defendant who gave a false name upon arrest had not
knowingly or voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial
on another matter).

Cf. State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641 (Utah 1982);

State v. Myers. 29 Utah 2d 254, 508 P.2d 41 (1973).

Accordingly,

/
/

it appears that defendant is entitled/to reversals of his
convictions and a remand of his case for a new trial.
CONCLUSION

5

Based upon the foregoing argument, the Court should
reverse defendant's convictions and remand the case for a new
trial.

\

l

> Qui***
oJ^

e*

*

1

That defendant may have violated a condition for his pretrial
reduction of bail by traveling to San Diego does not alter this
conclusion.
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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the trial can go forward if the penalty is not death, which
it is not in this case.
The second requirement is that the defendant must
have received notice of the trial setting.
clear that he did in this case.

And that is

Those are the two

requirements.
I might mentionr if it is an analogy, I'm not sure
it is, in the bail forfeiture statute -- chapter, it says\
that a bail forfeiture may be set aside if the defendant
cannot appear.

However, it may not be set aside if the

reason for his non-appearance was that he was in detention
in military or civil authorities.
the case here.

And that seems to be

If that's an analogy, then it would apply.

I do resist the motion.
THE COURT:

Rebuttal?

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, I don't know whether

it's appropriate or inappropriate analogy, but it seems
to me that I ought not to be put in the peculiar position
of asking for the issuance of a warrant.

And he hasn't

asked and you haven't taken the initiative to do that.
But I don't suppose at this juncture it would be inappropriate to ask that it be done.

And I think somebody from

law enforcement ought to confirm whether he's in San Diego.
And then I think we ought to find out if he would waive
extradition,

and if so, he could be brought back here.

CHRISTIANSEN.
JR.Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard BYRON
W. HunterRAY
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
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There's nothing wrong with admonishing this jury and
at least trying the case when he's present.
Now, admittedly, the rules have slacked up substantially
But I don't think anybody in this room questions what we
are doing.

It's just about as unique as any procedure that

I've been involved with, and I think that it's the first
time it's been done in the state.

And I think more effort

ought to be made by the Court to see if that man can be
here.

That's all I'm suggesting.
I don't like running back and forth from Salt Lake

and Beaver either but —
THE COURT:

I love it.

MR. VAN SCIVER:

I don't want to end up trying

the case a second or third time, at least a second.

I

don't know why we can't confirm that he's there and
available.
THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

I'll submit it.

All right, the matter having been

submitted to the Court, and I take it, Mr. Van Sciver,
what you are really doing is renewing your motion for
a continuance?
MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

I am.

And the Court held that yesterday

after you made it, until you had an opportunity to further
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
C E R T I F I E D S H O R T H A N D REPORTER
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supplement it with whatever you wanted in the record.
And I take it the record is now full on that issue.
MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

It is.

All right, the first ground,

as

I understand it, is because counsel for the defendant has
only had the opportunity of personally interviewing his
client, Robert Glen Houtz, one half-hour period with
respect to the facts and circumstances and the defense
in this case.

Do I correctly state that?

MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

You do, your Honor.

And in addition to that, counsel has

pointed out to the Court that he, as counsel for the
defendant, is under a serious disability by reason of the
absence of the defendant.
MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

Do I state that correctly?
You do.

And as a further reason, counsel

for the defendant submits to the Court that as of ten
o'clock last evening, the whereabouts of the defendant
has been, at least in some manner, determined by the.
Beaver County Sheriff's Department as being incarcerated
in San Diego City, State of California, under a charge
of driving under the influence, bail set, the best hearsay,
at $7 50.

Do I state that correctly?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
MR. VAN SCIVER:

That's correct, your Honor.

That is.

BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND

REPORTER
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

Now, then, the Court

2

having listened to the argument of respective counsel and

3

having reviewed the file and the file revealing (1) that

4

the Information was filed in this Court on or about Septembe^

5

14, 1984, and that counsel -- let's see, he was arraigned

6

on September 17, 1984, wherein a plea of not guilty on

7

all counts was entered.

B

review it, in the amount of $100,000, and not posted; and

9

that an application was made, to this Court, by a motion,

ID
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2D

The bail had been set, as I

with a mailing certificate 28th day of September, 1984,
over the signature of instant counsel, Mr. Robert Van Sciverj
and I should say that the record shows that Mr. Leo Kanell,
an attorney licensed and practicing in the State of Utah
and charged with Beaver County's counsel for those who
are determined indigent, on some basis appeared at
arraignment.

Did he represent him at the preliminary hearing,

Mr. Christiansen?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
THE COURT:

Yes, he did, your Honor.

All right, Mr. Kanell having repre-

sented the accused at preliminary hearing; and the Court

21 i

having reviewed the motion to reduce bail, over the signa22 !

ture of Robert Van Sciver, attorney for the defendant,
23 |
and that motion to reduce bail having been supported by an
24
affidavit of Mr. Robert Van Sciver, setting forth (1) "I
25
am the attorney for the defendant in the above-entitled

j
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
CERTIFIED S H O R T H A N D REPORTER
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1
2

matter and as such have personal knowledge of the defendant.
(2)

"The defendant is presently being held in the

3

Beaver County Jail on a $100,000 bond and charged with

4

two counts of automobile homicide, third-degree felonies.

5

(3)

"In spite of the transitory appearance of the

6

defendant, he has lived in the Salt Lake valley for 20

7

years, has been employed as a businessman in the Salt Lake

e

valley for the same period of time, and is the father of

9

six children.

ID

(4)

11
12

"A high probability exists that the defendant

will not be convicted as charged.
(5)

"As a condition of bail, the defendant would

13

consent to remain in Salt Lake County, living with his

14

son, Greg Houtz, who has adequate physical facilities to

15

provide him housing.

16

for employment.

17

(6)

He will also be afforded opportunities

"Because of congested trial calendars and

IB

because of the complex

19

circumstantial case,

20

to assist counsel with his case through bail, and adequate

21

time to prepare cannot be afforded within the time permitted

22

by law when one is in custody.

nature of what appear to be a
the defendant should be made available

23

Dated this 28th day of September, 1984," over the

24

signature of Robert Van Sciver, attorney for the defendant.

25

On that basis, this Court reduced the bail to $15,000 cash
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
C E R T I F I E D S H O R T H A N D REPORTER
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1

or appropriate and approved corporate surety.

2 1

was signed by myself, as District Judge, on the 25th day

3

of October, 1984.

4

And that

The record should show that Mr. Robert Van Sciver

5 J

is an attorney, this Court will take judicial knowledge

6

of this, who has considerable reputation in trial work

7 I

not only in the State of Utah but in sister and neighboring

B

states.

9

I

And this Court, on the basis of the affidavit,

by an officer of the Court, who I have due respect for,

ID

and on those representations I reduced the bail to afford

11

an opportunity to prepare for trial.

12

J

Now, the minute entry will further show, or the

131

record will further show, that trial was originally set,

14

over the signature of Sheila G. Rose, Trial Court

I

15

Executive, on the 27th of December, 1984, and a mailing

16

certificate on the same day to Mr. Robert Van Sciver.

17

That notice shows that the trial was reset for the

IB

25th day of February, 198 5 beginning at ten o'clock

19

a.m. in this courtroom, Beaver County Courthouse, Beaver,

2D

21

I

Utah
The Court, by reason of a telephone conversation

22

with Mr. Van Sciver, who advised the Court that the

23

defendant and accused intended to waive a jury, and the

24

Court, on the 25th of February, 1985, having a jury already

25

summoned to come in to try two jury cases; and again upon
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND

REPORTER
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the representation of counsel, an officer of the Court,
this Court changed the sequence of trials and tried another
jury matter on Monday, setting this matter on Tuesday, the
26th of February, to follow the jury trial, so that the
summoning of the jury and the expense would come to some
beneficial effect.
The Court agreed to allow counsel for the defendant
and the defendant to appear on the 26th for trial and at
that time to waive the jury, after being advised by this
Court of what he was doing and the circumstances surrounding
his waiving a constitutional act. And I told counsel that
I would require it to be in writing, signed in Court at
that time, after inquiry.
Yesterday morning, at the time of trial, Mr* Van
Sciver appeared but the defendant did not.

At that time

Mr. Van Sciver advised the Court that he had only had
one half hour-conference with the defendant from the entry
of his counsel of record in September of 1984 until the
instant date, to-wit, February 25, 1985.
Now, then, while counsel for the defendant was
present, the defendant was not.

Without the defendant's

presence, the Court would not and could, under the law,
proceed with trial without a jury, because the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of this state
provide with emphasis that an accused has the right to be
BYRON

RAY

CHRISTIANSEN,

JR.

C E R T I F I E D S H O R T H A N D REPORTER
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present, with certain limited exceptions; he has the right
to a trial by juryr unless he knowingly and after advice
waives that in open court.

And I required it to be in

writing, so that the record is clear.
Therefore, the Court could not proceed with trial,
and finding the grounds that counsel made for a continuance
not effectively, not sufficient, held the motion until
today to allow Mr. Van Sciver to further supplement the
motion with facts or law; and the Court having been advised
by Mr. Van Sciver that he talked to the defendant on
Saturday, the 23rd of February -- and, now, I take it that
that was by telephone?
MR. VAN SCIVER:

It was, your Honor.

And I

inquired where he was and he said Salt Lake County.
THE COURT:

All right.

And the Court further

having released him on a reduced bail with the understanding that he would reside in the Salt Lake County
area and be available for preparation; and the Court
finding that he has violated that condition and that the
Court would find the fact that Mr. Van Sciver has not
had an opportunity to talk to him more than one-half
hour is by cause and fault of the defendant and not Mr.
Van Sciver; and that he has absented himself from this
area on the day of trial set and that he had knowledge of
that, and this Court finds that it is voluntary and without
BYRON

RAY

CHRISTIANSEN.

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND

JR.

REPORTER
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good cause, and the motion for continuance is denied.
Mr, Christiansen, do you have anything further in
the record?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Nothing further on that

matter, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Van Sciver, do you have anything

further to go in the record on that matter?
MR. VAN SCIVER:
defense lawyer ask for

We f re going to make the

the warrant after all, is that

what it comes down to?
THE COURT:

Well, we 1 re not —

that with you in chambers.

I'll discuss

I have no problem at all in

ordering a warrant for the arrest and if necessary the
extradition

of the defendant.

with this trial.

We're going to go forward

That's the order.

Now, anything further, Mr. Christiansen?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
Honor.

I do

Not on that matter, your

—

THE COURT:

Mr. Van Sciver?

MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

Nothing.

All right, now, Mr. Van Sciver,

do you have any other motions?
MR. VAN SCIVER:
THE COURT:

I have none.

Mr. Christiansen?

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Yes, I have a motion, your
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